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Abstract: Noam Chomsky incarnates rationalism in 
the study of language like no other man has or does in 
man’s history, it seems to me. I will attempt to 
elucidate this position, however inchoately and 
incompletely, by enumerating his revolutionarily 
perceptive contributions to the study of language as a 
phenomenon. There is so much conventional 
perceptual deadwood about language that its position 
in epistemological space needs to be clarified, and 
perspectivised, deadwood that has come down and 
continues to float down the canons in the social sciences 
and the humanities. Once clarified, people could agree 
or disagree. People now seem to disagree with some of 
these positions without understanding them! The 
paper will position Chomsky in his niche in the history 
of ideas about language, a niche which is noticeably 
distinctly different from that of a Panini, the great 
Indian grammarian or a Sibavahi, the great Arabic 
grammarian, the three of whom together form the 
great grammarian trio the world has seen 2 . The 
intervention is clearly more an elucidatory, albeit 
argumentative, exercise than an originally researched 
paper although of course it has to do with placing 
language in epistemological space. 
The first thing that comes to mind is the genesis of 
human language. Various reasons, which merit 
mention and elucidation, prompt the conclusion that 
language is not, and can’t be, social in origin.  
Nature Gives the Structural Template and 
Nurture the Slot-fillers. 
Language is NOT a social idea. 
It is part of our original equipment, a genetic given, 
part of our instinctual make-up. It couldn’t be that 
one day or over a period of time humans decided to 
have language and resolved to have this or that rule, 
      1 The piece is a journal version of a talk I gave in a seminar on Chomsky and the Contemporary World in the 
department of philosophy at the University of Pondicherry, India in 2009. I thank all those who fed me back there. I have 
drawn on (my internalization of) the whole body of Chomskean thought on language so that there are no specific references 
in the article.   2  The beauty is that all these three are/were monolingual!  
or they developed it not in a meeting called for the 
purpose but evolved it in what can be called in their 
‘social unconscious’. It is difficult to imagine 
language evolving socially without a predefined 
preexisting schema, a schema apparently driven 
nonsocially.  
Our ability to speak, in other words, is not socially 
motivated/constituted.  
The overriding evidence is first language 
acquisition. Children pick up any language that they 
are exposed to without any fuss, without any 
struggle and without any formal instruction. 
Uninstructed but unerring language acquisition at 
the young age of one and two years means that there 
is something innate in them that makes such a 
phenomenon possible. My granddaughter mastered 
the yes-no interrogation rule in Kannada, a South 
Dravidian language spoken in southern India when 
she was barely two and a half years old. The rule is 
for consonant-ending and enunciative vowel-ending 
words, add –a, the enunciative vowel being deleted 
in the latter case, and add -a elsewhere, with an 
inflectional increment n coming in. It is a pretty 
involute rule and to think that a two year old could 
master it is a tribute to the germ of language 
embedded deep in her consciousness. The 
complexity of the rule and the immaturity of her age 
rule out inductive inferencing.  
Part of the evidence for saying it is not inductive 
inferencing is the fact that    
when quizzed, she can’t make the rules explicit but 
she implements the rules that define the language 
she has come to acquire with amazing finesse. 
I gave her the following passage 
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There lived a king in xanabou. He had three wives 
and four children. Two of the children were boys. 
I followed it up with the question of 
How many daughters did the king have? 
Much less answer the question, she didn’t follow the 
question, which sheds light on the stage of evolution 
of her logical inferencing abilities.    
 There is a distinction made between what is called 
'declarative knowledge' and 'procedural knowledge'. 
Declarative knowledge has to do with the 'what' of 
knowledge whereas procedural knowledge has to do 
with the 'how'. I know 'how' to swim without 
necessarily knowing its what, without knowing what 
swimming entails. Language is something like this. 
We know how to speak a particular language 
without knowing the 'what' of it. Native speakers 
have procedural knowledge of language, and not its 
declarative knowledge. Nobody teaches the kid how 
to move on its sides, how to crane its neck and how 
to sit, stand and walk. But she does it as expertly as 
any adult, as expertly and facilely as any Olympic 
athlete. If this fact viz that we speak language like 
we walk, i.e instinctively, without consciously 
thinking about it, is true as it undoubtedly seems to 
be, the conclusion is that language is embedded in 
our biology, in our genes. Much as our ability to 
move on our sides, crane our necks, sit, stand and lift 
our legs as we walk is part of our genetic blueprint, 
so is language. When a kid is born, the foundational 
structure, often called grammar, of all human 
languages is in her genes. Not just that of the 
language she would finally turn out to be speaking. 
As Chomsky says, there is a switch board of 
parameters which the kid has to choose from to build 
on the shared universal grammar. (This choice is a 
function of the linguistic ambience that the child is 
exposed to, the linguistic environs functioning as a 
trigger to our original equipment.) What this means 
is that this foundational structure of human 
language, which is in our genes, and which 
admittedly subsequently comes to exist in lived 
experience, is less easily subject to lived experience 
than lexica are. The part of language that is a 
growing and dynamic flux is not so much the 
structure part of it as its lexicon and its ethnography 
of speaking etc. This is not to rule out grammar 
being subject to lived experience.     
There is an existent core and a nonexistent core 
which grammars of all human languages share and 
these are typically not subject to lived experience. 
The fact that all human languages must have 
phonemes and morphemes and words, phrases and 
sentences, that they  should have nouns and verbs 
exemplify the former and the rule of not being able 
to extract an NP that is part of a coordinate NP, and 
question it, mentioned below, for example 
exemplifies the latter. Lived experience could 
possibly change parts of this foundational structure 
of language over long spans of time, over hundreds 
and thousands of years. The foundational structure 
of language, often called grammar, is more like a 
biological object, say, the human hand which 
although it exists in lived experience is subject to it 
only in a non immediate sense. This analogy may 
not be terribly apt though. It is the lexicon among 
other things that sort of constitute the 'floating 
population', the easily mutable parts of the language, 
which is obviously and readily subject to lived 
experience. A nearly irrefutable evidence is facts 
like a newly born kid today anywhere in the world 
would have the procedural knowledge of the fact 
that she can't extract an NP out of a coordinate NP 
and question it (eg. 2 below). She could extract an 
NP that is part of a prepositional phrase and question 
it (eg, 1 below).
1     a. Giridhar went to the party with his friend 
b. Who did Giridhar go to the party with?
2     a. Giridhar and his friend went to the party. 
* b. Who did Giridhar go to the party and?
 The coldly empirical fact of the impossibility of a 
question-sentence like  
3. What did you die?
Or the impossibility of 
4. Kevini killed Kevini
as opposed to 
      4a.     Kevin killed herself 
is clearly not because of any sociocultural reasons, 
not because of any reasons of communication, but 
because of reasons of biology, genes and the 
consequent culture-free cognition. You can’t ask a 
question addressing the nonexistent object NP of an 
intransitive verb. Nor can you not use the reflexive 
pronoun (or some such strategy in languages other 
than English) when two full NP’s are coreferential 
in a clause.   
Structural properties of language are typically 
biologically rather than logically necessary 
properties.  Thus statements like  
 People is more important than anything, even 
grammar. 
 (Dan Harmon in Reader's Digest Oct 2014 p:160) 
or a similar statement attributed to Shankaracharya 
17 | GSTF Journal on Education (JED) Vol.3 No.2, August 2016
P.P Giridhar
When it is a question of life, grammar doesn't matter 
or people don't worry about grammar. 
don't make sense in that they have no relevance, or 
the question doesn’t arise. People, life and grammars 
occupy different cosmoses. On one’s death bed, or 
faced with terrorists, nobody will say 
  People is more important than grammar. 
or, when I am faced with a life-threatening situation, 
I won’t think now it makes no difference whether I 
say  
 People is important...   
or 
 People are more important... 
and so let me say 
People is more important...  
Nobody would do that. As I said, the question 
doesn’t arise.  
It is like saying when it comes to people and life, you 
don't have to worry about how to move your limbs! 
How to move your limbs doesn't relate at all to life 
or people in the sense hinted at in the above two 
statements. It is instinctive. The question of how to 
move your limbs is orthogonal to the global question 
of life.   
The suspicion is that some fifty thousand years after 
man's appearance on earth a mutation caused by 
some external factor such as cosmic rays engendered 
language in man.  
The thesis that language is genetic and not 
social in origin has a number of consequences: 
1. TThat like there are genetic constraints on how
we move our limbs and how we see or hear (for
example, motion pictures are a function of the
inability of the human eye to separate out still
pictures that are flashed in rapid succession, and
the human ear can't hear sounds below a lower
and an upper limit of decibels, humans can’t
fold their hands/arms backward, their legs
forward  ...), there are constraints on what could
happen and couldn't happen in language or to it,
constraints leading to rigorous regularities.
Irregularities, irregular forms for example,
belong to the finite periphery of language while
rules, regularities, constraints and 
conditionalities belong to the heart of language, 
to the infinite expanse that language as output 
is. 
2. 2That languages couldn't differ in unlimited and
unpredictable ways. This has become obvious
now. As Chomsky says, that in some languages
adjectives follow and in some, adjectives
precede the head word, or adpositions follow in
some languages and in some precede the noun
could be instances of externalizations of what
internally is the same thing.
3. 3Even under conditions of insanity and
psychoticity we use our limbs and senses as
normally as we always used. So seems to be the
case with language. Grammar is NOT lost with
insanity or psychoticity. I had a neighbour who
had lost her memory to such an extent she even
forgot that she had to wear something before
going out etc. But she hadn’t lost her language,
she would speak perfectly grammatical
Kannada sentences. I am sure she would have
lost skills acquired in life which had no
specifically genetic underpinning like
swimming or driving a car or knitting and
crocheting, cooking etc. This is more significant
than some of us realize. That, in contrast, she
hadn’t lost language, much like she hadn’t
forgotten how to walk, how to use her hands,
her fingers etc. points clearly to the fact that
language has genetic moorings. Even in
language, one expects her to lose lexical items
before losing linguistic structure, which is
evidence that linguistic structure is more
quintessential than lexicon.
4. 4That language is not organically or
intrinsically related to communication.
a. Suppose I think of writing a piece on
carcinogenesis tonight. The next morning I
externalize it, viz the mental world I have created,
making marks on pieces of paper, or record it in a
CD and keep it for a few days. Let’s call it the first
stage. After a few days I decide to give a talk to the
local cancer society and do give a talk on my
ruminations. Stage no 2. After a few days I send my
write-up to an international journal on cancer to be
published to be presumably available for a wider
reading public. Stage no 3. The argument is that the
language act is complete with stage no 1.
Stage nos 2 and 3 only exemplify one of the (social)
uses of language. Grammar,  the heart of language,
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is not worried about, in fact has nothing to do with, 
stage nos two and three. 
b. I write a love letter to the girl I am smitten with
and stash it away for a decade. The fact that it has
reached no one doesn’t make my language
behaviour that much less valid than if it has reached
her or anyone else. The question of the use of such
language behavior as does not communicate is NOT
relevant to natural language.
c. I stand before a corpse and tearfully say,
 “I am inconsolably sorry for what I have done. It is 
because of me that you have died.” 
 I stand before an idol of God and ululate, 
 “God! What have you done? You took away my 
father! As if that was not enough now you   took 
away my wife! You are ruthless and have no 
mercy. I will no longer come to you!”  
Both soliloquies are complete language acts 
although there is no chance of ‘communication’. 
That the validity of the language act is not a 
function of whether it traverses interpersonal space 
is what is meant by saying that there is no 
structure-function relation between language and 
communication. This is what is meant when 
we say that linguistic structure is NOT a 
function of communication because 
communication is not part of the definition of 
language, because communication is not a 
function, but only a use of language.  
d. We have seen psychotics saying things loudly to
no one in particular on streets. The fact that it may
not reach anyone doesn’t invalidate the psychotic’s
linguistic behavior.
e. We see/hear people saying as they enter houses Is
there anyone in the house?
Or 
See I have brought you so many things! Where have 
you gone? Come! 
and so on.  Even if there is no one listening, language 
has been performed.   
f. Arguably, the speaking animal’s linguistic
behavior could be tailor-made in response to the
requirements of her interlocutor.
To say that this is to admit that communication 
dictates linguistic behavior is to be delightfully 
myopic.  
I could say something and my interlocutor might 
not understand it and might ask me to say what I 
mean in other ways. I may then reword, 
rephrase and restructure what I said to begin with. 
What is happening here is the following: 
My restructuring of my initial content is dictated at 
some level by the needs of communication, yes, but 
the point is the structure per se, the being per se of 
my subsequent language behaviour is not a function 
of communication. It is a function of gene-driven 
cognition. My choice of alternative possibilities that 
I juggle with is a function of the interlocutor’s 
wants. An analogy would be:  I have a 
bowl of pomegranates, apples, bananas, oranges, 
mangoes, grapes and so on. The eater is asking me 
for one of them. I gave him by mistake some other 
fruit. Now I give him his requirement, which may 
be a function of his tastes, his abilities (eg he may 
be toothless) and so on. Now, one can’t say the 
structure of the fruit he requires and which the 
supplier gave him is a function of the 
requirement. The structure of oranges and 
guavas is NOT dictated by the eater’s needs and 
requirements. Nature decides its structure and 
nature. This is the case with natural language as 
well.    
Expressive behaviour is not necessarily 
communicative behaviour. Somebody nods her 
head as she listens to the speaker in a meeting. 
This is pure expression of the self: It is NOT 
communication. It could be construed to be 
agreement by the on-lookers, in which case it 
becomes communication. When this happens 
with language behaviour, it takes on an 
‘interactive function’, and it is then that society 
enters the scene.   Then you have the sociology 
etc of language. This is a use, an external 
happening. 
A piece of painting for example is expressive 
behaviour, to begin with and to end with, without 
necessarily being communicative behaviour. It is 
not clear in the case of painting how the 
expressive behaviour that it is also becomes 
communicative behaviour, if it does at all. I don’t 
know if we can hazard the statement that 
human linguistic behaviour is at the same 
time expressive and communicative behaviour. 
That the facilitator of thinking and creating 
mental worlds that natural language is 
constitutes at the same time 
communicational or communicable material.  
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Whether the venting is ipso facto communication 
is debatable. 
It is more precise to say it is expressive to begin with 
and it is subsequently put to the use of 
communication, which then leads to nonlinguistic 
action, although in the case of language, the two 
seem to happen simultaneously. The latter is what 
Chomsky thinks. One needs to understand the 
subtlety of the situation.     
This biologism ending up in mentalism and 
cognitivism in Linguistics is largely due to Chomsky 
and his aficionados. At least none has articulated it 
as relentlessly and with as much rationally driven 
vehemence as he has. If the biologism, mentalism, 
cognitivism and the consequent deductivism and the 
‘central reciprocal relationship’ (Walter Benjamin’s 
expression) of human languages are the bottomline 
about language, one is not sure whether Chomsky 
and Panini are comparable at all. They are clearly on 
different footings. Panini has apparently not talked 
about UG, deductivism, biologism, mentalism and 
cognitivism, or Has he?  
These stand opposed to the social origin of language, 
to behaviorism and empiricism, to inductivism. 
Compare the stand of someone like Skinner who 
said except things like seeing and hearing everything 
else is learnt behaviour, the classic s-r behaviorism. 
An offshoot of biologism, mentalism and 
cognitivism in linguistics is deductivism as opposed 
to inductivism. We can now argue - not now, but for 
quite some time now -  that certain things are not 
possible in human languages not by looking at each 
and every human language but deductively, without 
looking at any language in particular. Anoop 
Mahajan of UCLA presented a paper at the CIIL, 
Mysuru, India long back, arguing deductively why 
certain word orders are not possible in human 
language. What he said must be true of natural 
languages long dead like Chibcha, the central 
Columbian language and of languages yet to be 
born. 
These things have nothing at all to do with 
cultures, societies and belief systems, a mistaken 
assumption some people continue to make 
despite formidable evidence to the contrary.  
It has become irrefutably clear for some time now 
that language is not a social arrangement in a 
significant sense. It is a genetic idea, a genetic given, 
which is computationally configured to serve as an 
inner mental tool, a tool for thinking and for creating 
mental worlds. If this is true as it seems to be, then 
there is no evidence to say that language was 
designed for communication although one of its uses 
is for communication. As Chomsky says, that 
language is used for communication is trivially true. 
What is nontrivially true is that language is there for 
thinking and for creating mental worlds. I have over 
the years understood this, and have come to agree. 
Computational efficiency is promoted in language 
design, says Chomsky, even at the cost of 
communicational efficiency.  
There is no reason to believe that the genetic-
cognitive and mathematical-computational 
foundations of language are less important than what 
may be called its cultural determinants, much as 
there is no reason to believe that human oneness is 
less interesting or less important than human 
diversity. Some years back I gave Chomsky a fill-in-
the-blanks exercise which ran as follows:  
Language is genetically or    biologically founded, 
computationally or mathematically configured and 
socially ---     
He refused to fall to the bait, saying it can't be 
sensibly filled!  
This is of course not to say that there is no society 
involved at any level in language. In parts of its use 
language is or becomes a social phenomenon.  As 
we said, vocabulary has of course to do with culture, 
which is precisely why it, unlike structure, is 
negotiable. And society comes into the picture once 
language is put to the use of communication. Till 
that point, natural language is deeply individual.  
The only hitch to the idea of language being 
individual might be the existence of things like 
politeness expressions, second person pronouns and 
so on. The thing to say is that man has a social face 
and he needs these in his language rather than say 
that these are there because language is social. Much 
like the thesis that it is not language that has a poetic 
face, evil vocabulary and so on but man has these 
facets which language is there to externalise. This is 
also my counter to people’s assertion that natural 
language has a poetic or literary face or use or 
function. It is not language that has a literary face or 
function, but it is man who has a poetic face to his 
personality which the resources of language are only 
used to express.  
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Natural language is there quintessentially to 
think and to build mental worlds.     
Language occupies a unique place in the human 
scheme of things in as much as it is at the same time 
a rigorously rule-governed scientific system per se, 
an object in, or a wonder of, the natural world and at 
the same time a social object, unlike, let’s say, a 
falling stone. It in fact is many-phased: it has a 
biological genetic phase, a cognitive phase, a 
representational structure phase, a physical phase, a 
philosophical phase, a mathematical computational 
phase, a social phase, a political phase, a 
communicative civilisational phase…We need to be 
careful when saying language is a social 
phenomenon. Especially cultural anthropologists 
and literary cognoscenti have been saying that 
language is a social phenomenon par excellence. 
This is part of their unthinking traditional canon. We 
need to rein in the extremely seductive relation 
obtaining between language and culture. See 
Giridhar 1981 for some discussion of the interface 
between language and culture. We need to say when 
and where language is social. Language is 
essentialist at significant levels. It is a procrustean 
bed in a significant sense.  
Nonprocrustean beds don't facilitate thinking 
and creating mental worlds that natural 
language can.  
People have also been saying that language creates 
reality.  
The sense in which language creates reality is not 
clear, or could be misleading. The build of language 
per se could apparently give rise to conceptual 
constructs that have no empirical correlates. The 
mental worlds language creates may be fictive. A 
genuinely creative entity however is a causative 
entity. Language is not the causative factor in 
cognising and making sense of the world, something 
(both the linguistic relativity and linguistic-
determinism parts of) the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis 
came close to saying. It could be our language in 
turn that shapes, at least partly shapes, the way we 
cognize the world. It is our cognition, to begin with, 
that is causative, it is our cognition that makes sense 
of the world and language reflects that cognition. 
Language expresses that cognition by codifying it, 
by becoming a tool for thinking, becoming a partial 
shaper of the way we think about the world, partly 
shaping the way we look at things, in terms of that 
cognition. It is clear at the same time that what I can 
express through my language or any language is 
only part of what I can think and cognize. . What is 
expressed through language would always be a 
subset of varying sizes of what I can think. 
Cognition is the primeval thing, the 'original' thing 
if you will, and language mediates the relation 
between that cognition and the world.  
In other words language is NOT everything in 
human life, pace what some people think.   
Human language is a subset of human thinking, 
which is a subset of human consciousness. All 
terrains of consciousness are not available for 
thinking just as all arenas of thinking are not 
available for language. 
Thinking, creating mental worlds and expressing or 
externalising that thinking is seminal to civilization. 
Language is central to that thinking and expressing. 
Grammar, the set of rules that normatively defines a 
language is central to language. It is Chomsky who 
has overwhelmingly argued that grammar is basic 
and language derivative, another timeless insight
from the master. Everything about language is built 
on the understructure of grammar.  
Homo loquens is homo grammaticus in her core.
If as we said thinking, creating mental worlds and 
externalizing it are central to civilization, if 
language is central to that thinking and externalizing 
that thinking  and conveying it to nonself 
(=communication(?)), and if grammar is central to 
language, then it follows that grammar is central to 
civilization. Many of us need to mull such primacy 
of grammar in the human scheme of things. There is 
a recently published MIT book on the primacy of 
grammar. 
It is perfectly legitimate for us to posit ideal states of 
man’s being. To posit an ideal husband, an ideal 
wife, an ideal son, ideal father, an ideal mother, an 
ideal friend, an ideal king and so on, And an ideal 
speaker-hearer. This is an epistemological 
imperative. It is nobody’s brief that such entities 
exist empirically. Chomsky has been unjustly 
criticised for doing precisely this. Epistemological 
imperatives that they are, such positings have the 
function of understanding things in perspective.  
This is tied to the opposition between the manifest 
and the nonmanifest, appearance and reality, the 
superficial and the underlying, the surface and the 
deep. This is a dichotomy familiar to us in many 
facets of human existence. This is also true of 
language, both in its nitty-gritty and its global being. 
What we utter is a sign of what is there in our heads. 
What we perform is a reflection of our ability, our 
‘competence’.     
One suspects that since our capacity for what is 
called 'culture' is also genetically founded, there 
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could be arguments for a UC (Universal Culture) 
and parametric variations of that UC. What makes 
this issue, of the human genetic capacity for culture 
giving rise to such an amorphous, seemingly 
unsystematisable scene is something to mull. 
This is the scene of the internal build of language. I 
don’t think anyone else has drawn the bottomline 
about the structural dynamics of this internal build 
more perceptively holistically than Chomsky. This 
again is not to deny whatever has since been said 
about the external function of language, viz about 
the dynamics of the interface between this internal 
build of language and whatever language does as an 
object in social space, as an identity marker, as a 
symbol of social solidarity, its sociohistory and so 
on and so forth.    
Both these pictures, to perorate, are delightfully 
complementary and valid, I think and are NOT 
mutually contradictory, pace what many people 
seem to think.     
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